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Income from production of peanuts is critical to farmers in eight localities of Southeastern Virginia.  From
1998-2000, an average of $58.4 million per year was earned from peanut production under a quota system
whose policy foundations reach back to the Great Depression.  The existing peanut quota system would be
eliminated if the Farm Security Act of 2001 (H.R. 2646) is enacted.  The new peanut program would be
structured much like existing programs for corn, wheat, and cotton, with eligible peanut producers receiving
direct support payments through fixed and counter-cyclical payments on historic production, and price
protection through loan deficiency and marketing loan payments on current production.  Peanut quota own-
ers would receive buy-out payments over the next five years as compensation for policy termination of their
quota.
The Virginia-North Carolina region produces approximately 75 percent of Virginia-type peanuts and about
14 percent of total U.S. peanut production.  Since passage of the 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform Act, Virginia peanut acreage has fallen by 17 percent.  Unlike farmers in rapidly expanding, low-
cost regions such as the High Plains of Texas, Virginia farmers do not harvest any significant peanut produc-
tion beyond that supported at the quota loan rate.  Economic theory suggests that elimination of the quota
system would decrease production and market income in a high-cost region, but increased direct govern-
ment payments and decreased land rentals could leave producer income either higher or lower than with the
quota system.
The farm-level economic impacts of the potential new peanut program were examined by developing a
budgeting model of a commercial-sized Southampton County peanut farm owing 17 percent of its produced
quota and renting the remainder.  Under the current peanut program, net farm-related income from market
sales and government payments over variable costs and rent is $151,065.  Government payments are 22
percent of net farm-related income.  Net income does not cover cropping enterprise total costs, much less
earn a competitive rate of return on the owner’s management and equity.  If H.R. 2646 is enacted, net farm-
related income for this farm would fall to $145,554 or -3.6 percent.  Government payments would rise to 55
percent of net farm-related income.  Completion of the quota buy-out after five years would further decrease
net income by $13,819 or -9.5 percent.  During the buy-out period, the Southampton farm does not cover its
total costs of production unless peanut market prices rise above $460 per ton.  The economic impacts with
quota buy-out payments differ significantly for farmers owning the current peanut quota.  A farmer currently
renting all peanut quota produced would see net income fall by 9.1 percent if H.R. 2646 is enacted, but a
farmer owning all quota produced would see net income rise by 17.6 percent.  The new peanut program
provides planting flexibility, and the farmer is not required to plant peanuts in order to earn government
payments.  Considering only market net returns, the Southampton farmer will earn approximately $30,000
less net income by including peanuts in the crop mix.  If H.R. 2646 is enacted, Virginia peanut farmers
should carefully assess their costs, price expectations, and profit opportunities under a dramatically changed
economic environment.1
INTRODUCTION
Peanuts are one of the most important cash crops in Virginia.  Peanut acreage has ranked fifth or sixth
among crops produced in the state since 1996, and because of high per-acre value, peanuts rank among
the top three Virginia crops in cash receipts.  Peanut production is concentrated in eight counties/independent
cities of Southeastern Virginia: Dinwiddie, Greensville, Isle of Wight, Prince George, Southampton, Surry,
Sussex, and Suffolk City.  With peanut production so concentrated geographically, it is more important to
farm incomes in Southeastern Virginia than indicated by its overall rank in the state.
Domestic production of peanuts for the edible food market in the U. S. has been regulated by acreage
allotments or marketing quotas since the 1930s.  Peanut imports have also been restricted to insulate the
U.S. market from foreign competition.  The current peanut program sets an annual national poundage
quota for domestic production for the edible market that is allocated among states and individual producers
based largely on historic quota rights.  Relatively high price support for the regulated output of peanuts
for the domestic market is maintained through loan rates at which farmers can forfeit their quota peanuts
to the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) instead of selling their crop through commercial channels.
Peanuts produced in excess of the assigned quotas are known as “additionals.”  The production of
additionals is not controlled by allotments or quotas, but these peanuts can only be sold for processing and
export.  CCC loan rates and market prices for additionals have been much lower than for quota peanuts
produced for the domestic edible market.   Almost all Virginia production is of the Virginia-type peanut—
a large, high quality peanut primarily consumed as a snack or in snack foods.  Relatively few additionals
are produced in Virginia; hence, Virginia-grown peanuts are typically consumed domestically and are
eligible for the higher CCC loan rate.
National peanut quota peaked in 1995 at 1.7 million tons.  Under the 1996 farm bill, the price-support loan
rate for quota peanuts was lowered by 10 percent, and national quota poundage was reduced to more
closely match domestic demand.  Quota has subsequently been adjusted annually to avoid a build-up of
CCC stocks.  With these changes, national peanut quota poundage has fallen by about 20 percent since
1996.  Total national peanut production has not fallen as much; hence, a somewhat larger proportion of
production has been of additionals directed to domestic processing and exports.
During the 2001 farm bill debate, legislation has been introduced for a new approach to peanut policy.
The proposed peanut support program is included in the Farm Security Act of 2001 (H.R. 2646) passed
by the House of Representatives in early October 2001.  The Senate had not passed a new farm bill as
of late November 2001, and it remains uncertain whether the new approach to peanut policy included in
H.R. 2646 will become law.
The peanut provisions of H.R. 2646, if enacted, would replace the traditional quota system of regulated
production for the domestic edible market with a non-quota system of direct support payments similar to
those for grains and cotton.  Farmers would no longer have to own or rent quota to produce peanuts for
domestic edible consumption.  Instead, any farmer in the U.S. could produce peanuts for this market.  A
loan rate would still provide a minimum price guarantee for all peanuts grown domestically, but the
guarantee would be lower than has been provided in the past for quota peanuts.  Table 1 provides a
comparison of price support rates unter H.R. 2646 with those of the existing law.
Under H.R. 2646, past producers of both quota and additional peanuts would also receive direct income
support payments.  Those farmers qualifying as “historic peanut producers” based on peanut production
during 1998-2001 would be assigned a “peanut base acreage” and “payment yield.”  Historic peanut2
producers would be eligible for fixed and counter-cyclical direct payments.  Both the fixed and counter-
cyclical payments included in H.R. 2646 are based on the historic peanut production, not current or future
plantings.  The direct payments would guarantee producers a target price for 85 percent of their historic
production.  Farmers would have planting flexibility similar to other crops supported in H.R. 2646.  An
additional set of payments authorized in H.R 2646 is to buy out current peanut quota owners.  Because
peanut quota ownership is currently associated with land ownership, a peanut quota owner in not necessarily
a producer.   Instead, quota owners may rent their rights to peanut producers.   Under H.R. 2646, peanut
quota owners would receive additional direct payments annually for five years.
Replacing the existing peanut quota system with the proposed new support program in H.R. 2646 would
mark a dramatic change from past policy.  This REAP report evaluates the implications of the proposed
changes for Virginia peanut producers.  In section 2, the history of the peanut program is reviewed,
focusing on the changes implemented in the 1990 and 1996 farm bills and proposed in H.R.2646.  In
section 3, recent trends in peanut production by region are reviewed, and a basic economic model is used
to illustrate the effects that eliminating the traditional quota system might have on the supply of peanuts
from relatively high-cost and low-cost production regions.  In section 4, the farm-level economic impacts
and planting decisions that Virginia peanut producers might make under the proposed new policy are
evaluated.  The effects are analyzed in terms of market sales and revenue, variable and fixed production
costs, and impacts of the new direct payments on the incomes of farmers and peanut quota owners.  The
last section presents a summary and the implications of the proposed conversion from the traditional
quota system to a payment-based support policy.
OVERVIEW  OF  PEANUT  POLICY
During the late 1930s, recovery of the U. S. agricultural sector from the Great Depression was slow to
occur.  The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 authorized the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
to establish acreage allotments to limit the production of six crops (wheat, corn, cotton, rice, tobacco, and
peanuts) in conjunction with price support provided through loan rates at which farmers could forfeit
these commodities to the CCC without penalty.  Additional legislation in 1941 specifically established
production restrictions for peanuts (CRS, 1999).  The quantity that could be produced for the domestic
market was limited by awarding acreage allotments to farmers who had a history of producing peanuts.
Under the legislated support policies, domestic producers with acreage allotments received preferential
prices for peanuts supplied to the domestic market for edible uses compared to prices received for
peanuts sold for processing (crushing for oil and meal) or exports.  Access to the domestic edible market
by foreign competitors was restricted by import quotas.  Thus, acreage allotments created an income
stream from higher prices received exclusively by those farmers who were granted the allotments.
Table 1.  Summary of Price Support Rates for Peanuts under the FAIR Act and 
Proposed H.R. 2646 
Policy Instrument  Farm Bill 
  FAIR Act  H.R. 2646 
 ------------$/ton----------- 




Price and Payment Guarantees 
(for 85 percent of historical production) 
 
Target Price     --  480 
Fixed Direct Payments  --  36 
Direct Payments to Quota Owners (2001-2006)  --  200 
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Farmers without such allotments were barred from producing peanuts for the domestic edible market
and did not receive the same price support guarantee.
Evolving Farm Policy
Farm policy today has changed considerably from its New Deal origins.  The basic direction of change
for most crops has been a shift from annual acreage supply controls, combined with price supports above
market-clearing levels, to less supply intervention and more direct income support.  This policy evolution
toward direct payments began in the mid-1960s when price-support loan rate levels were lowered for
corn, wheat, and cotton to enhance U. S. competitiveness in world markets; and farmers were offered
direct payments as compensation for the lower price guarantees (Orden, Paarlberg and Roe, 1999).  A
further substantial change came in the 1985 farm bill, when loan rates, previously set too high in anticipation
of inflation and a low-valued dollar that did not materialize, were reduced nearly 25 percent, with larger
direct payments again made to farmers.  The 1990 farm bill continued the basic policies of the 1985
legislation.
The direction of change in peanut policy since the 1960s has not been the same as that for most other
crops.  Instead, peanut policy has continued to restrict production for the domestic edible market and to
provide price-support loan rates that are higher for domestic edible peanuts than for other uses.  In 1981,
acreage allotments were converted to poundage quotas.  Producers who had allotments were instead
granted quota eligibility to sell a certain quantity of peanuts (instead of the output from a certain acreage)
in the domestic edible market.  These quota production rights could be transferred or sold with the land on
which the peanuts were produced.  If the land was held within a family, the quota was passed on to
descendants who inherited the land.  If the land was sold, so was the quota.  Quota could be rented, but
initially the peanuts had to be grown on the land of the quota holder.  This planting restriction was
eventually eased to allow quota peanuts to be produced on the property of the renter or even on land
rented from a third party.  However, whether the quota was inherited, sold, or rented, the production of
quota peanuts had to be in the county where the original quota land was titled.
The 1990 farm bill legislated a minimum national poundage quota and support-price escalator that raised
the peanut loan rate based on estimated increases in production costs.  The national minimum quota was
set at 1.35 million tons (2,700 million pounds), and the loan rate for quota peanuts was set at $678/ton.
The average effective national quota during 1993-1995 was about 1. 5 million tons.  Effective quota was
calculated by taking basic quota and adding “undermarketings,” which allowed producers who experienced
a production shortage due to poor weather to carry that year’s shortfall of quota sales forward to the
following year.  The effective quota was nearly 80 percent of the average total national peanut production
but exceeded domestic edible peanut consumption by about 50 percent in the mid-1990s (ERS, 1998).
With this difference between the effective quota and actual domestic demand, the CCC was unable to
find commercial markets at the quota support price and began to accumulate peanut stocks.  These
stocks had to be held in storage or sold as additionals at far lower prices.  What had essentially been a
no-cost program, where consumers paid higher prices than processors or foreign buyers but with little
direct expense to the government, began to run up larger government costs (CRS, 2001).
The 1996 FAIR Act
The 1996 farm bill, titled the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act, marked a third
stage in the progression of farm policy toward direct payments for most crops.  A basic feature of the
1996-2002 FAIR Act is planting flexibility.  Fixed payments, known as Agricultural Market Transition Act
(AMTA) or Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) payments, that are based on past production replaced4
earlier deficiency payments tied to continued production of specific crops.  The PFC payments are
“decoupled” from prices and current planting decisions, so that farmers have a choice about what crops
they plant (or even whether to plant at all) under the FAIR Act.  Annual acreage reduction (ARP)
programs that required land idling in some years by participants in the support programs were eliminated,
and caps were set on loan rates for each crop.  The loan rates continue to offer protection against low
prices, but in lieu of placing crops into storage under CCC loans, the 1996 farm bill emphasized the option
of commodities being sold in commercial markets, with farmers then applying for loan deficiency payments
(LDPs) if the prices they received were less then the loan rate.
The FAIR Act also brought policy changes in the peanut program.  Processors and consumers pressured
Congress to lower the price of domestic edible peanuts and to reduce government costs resulting from
national quotas that exceeded domestic edible demand.  The FAIR Act lowered the loan rate for quota
peanuts for the domestic edible market from $678/ton to $610/ton and eliminated the price escalators that
had pushed loan rates up with rising production costs (CRS Brief, 2001).  The minimum national quota
and undermarketings were also eliminated, which allowed USDA to set annual poundage eligible for the
domestic market based on demand estimates.  The annual effective quota poundage was reduced from
1.47 million tons for the 1995 crop year to 1.15 million tons in the 1996 crop year (Table 2).
Under the FAIR Act, the effective quota has averaged 1.24 million tons during 1996-2000, only 82
percent of the effective quota average of 1.52 million tons for the pre-FAIR years of 1993-1995.  Despite
the reduced quota and a 9.3 percent reduction in average acreage planted, domestic peanut production
has remained nearly constant.  The average national production for 1996-2000 was 1.82 million tons, or
99 percent of the average of 1.85 million tons for the years 1993-1995.  Overall, peanut producers are
selling a relatively smaller proportion of their production at a lower quota support price for domestic
consumption and a relatively higher proportion in the additionals market.
One reason for the declining effective quota is that the U.S. and other countries have entered into new
agreements to increase agricultural trade.  Foreign producers’ access to the U.S. domestic peanut market
increased from less than 4 percent of domestic consumption in 1993 to over 10 percent in 2000 (Table 2).
This increase of imports was due to market-access provisions of the 1993 North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the 1995 World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture (ERS,
1998).  NAFTA provides a tariff rate for peanuts grown in Mexico that declines to zero in 2008, when
Table 2.  National Peanut Acreage and Production, Consumption, and Trade 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 ------------------------------------1,000 acres--------------------------------------- 
Planted    1,734 1,641 1,538 1,402 1,434 1,521 1,535 1,537 
Harvested    1,690 1,619 1,517 1,380 1,414 1,467 1,436 1,336 
 --------------------------------------1,000 tons--------------------------------------- 
Production  1,696 2,123 1,730 1,830 1,769 1,981 1,915 1,632 
Effective  Quota  1,638 1,463 1473 1,150 1,230 1,275 1,268 1,289 
Additionals  Production 58 660 257 680 539 706 647 343 
Total Edible 
Consumption  
1,084 1,045 1,034 1,064 1,085 1,105 1,154 1,139 
Domestic Quota Use  1,043  968  920  951  979  991  1,028  980 
Imported  Peanut  Use  41  77 114 113 106 114 126 159 
Sources: USDA, ERS. “U.S Peanut Consumption Rebounds,” conversation with Scott Sandford.  
USDA-TPD State Filings and PA-82R County Filings for production and quota as compiled by Jan 
Chvosta. 
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tariffs on all products in Mexican/U.S. trade are scheduled for elimination.  Peanut imports from other
countries beyond a limited quantity are still restricted by high tariffs under the WTO agreement.  But
potential competitors in peanut producing countries such as Argentina and Brazil could become eligible
for further reductions in tariffs under the Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA) that is currently being
negotiated or in future WTO negotiations (Fletcher and Smith, 2001).  As long as peanut prices in the
U.S. domestic market remain above world market prices,  foreign producers will have incentives to seek
additional access to the U.S. market.
Another change in the peanut program under the FAIR Act is that quota can be transferred (leased or
sold) across county lines within a state, but not across state lines.  This reform is being phased in until a
maximum 40 percent of the quota in a state can move across county lines by 2002.  This policy change
has allowed some quota peanut production to move from higher-cost production areas to lower-cost
areas.  The largest shift of production has occurred in Texas, where nearly all allowed quota has been
transferred from Central Texas to West Texas (Chvosta, Rucker, Thurman, 2001).   Fewer quota transfers
across county lines have occurred in other states.
Proposed Elimination of Peanut Quotas
With the 1996 FAIR Act set to expire in 2002, the Agriculture Committee of the U.S. House of
Representatives developed the “Farm Security Act of 2001” (H.R. 2646) which the Committee passed
on July 27, 2001 and the House of Representatives passed on October 5, 2001.  Included in the proposed
farm bill are changes to the peanut program that would significantly alter the way production, prices, and
government support have been managed since the 1930s.  Under H.R. 2646, the quota support system
would be replaced with a direct-payments program similar to other supported crops.  The new peanut
program would include three components: marketing loans, fixed decoupled payments, and counter-
cyclical payments.  In addition, peanut quota holders would be compensated for their lost quota rights.
The quota-value compensation would be payments of $200/ton to be made annually for five years.
The House farm bill would make a uniform marketing loan program available for all domestic peanut
production.  Farmers would be eligible for the loan rate for current production, regardless of whether
they qualified as an historic peanut producer under previous programs.  The peanut loan rate set in
H.R.2646 is $350/ton.  As with other crops, the peanut marketing loan would offer a level of protection
against low market prices.  Producers would have the option of applying for a loan deficiency payment if
prices were less than the loan rate and could then sell their peanuts in commercial markets.
For those farmers qualifying as historic peanut producers, additional income support would be provided
under H.R. 2646 by fixed decoupled and counter-cyclical direct payments.  An historic peanut producer
would be any person who produced or attempted to produce (e.g. if  the crop was destroyed by weather)
peanuts on a farm in the U.S. during any of the crop years from 1998-2001.  For these producers,
H.R.2646 calls for the establishment of payment yield, peanut base acres, and payment acres to be used
to calculate the production base for entitlement to payments.
Payment yield would be established by calculating the average yield for peanuts on a farm for the crop
years 1998-2001.  Peanut base acres would be established by calculating the average acreage planted or
prevented from being planted to peanuts over the same period.  Payment acres are 85 percent of the
peanut base acres.  Historic producers would be given a one-time opportunity to assign their peanut base
acreage to specific cropland on a farm, but such base acres do not have to be located where peanuts
were grown in the past.  Peanuts would not have to be grown on the assigned peanut base acreage, or at
all, in order to receive the government payments.  Eligible producers must use the peanut base acres for
some agricultural purpose or for conservation.6
Under H.R. 2646, fixed decoupled payments would be paid on historic production at a rate of $36/ton in
each of the crop years 2002 through 2011.  These payments would be similar to PFC payments established
by the 1996 FAIR Act for other crops and would be made to eligible historic producers regardless of the
market price of peanuts or whether peanuts continue to be produced.  The total amount of the fixed
annual payment to a farmer would be calculated by multiplying the fixed payment rate times the payment
yield times the payment acres.
The target price for peanuts is set at $480/ton for 2002-2011 by H.R. 2646.  Counter-cyclical payments
would be paid to eligible producers whenever the effective price for peanuts is below this target price.
The effective price would be set by the higher of the national average market price during the 12-month
marketing year plus the fixed payment rate or the national average loan rate plus the fixed payment rate.
The counter-cyclical payment rate would then be the difference between the target price and the effective
price.  The amount paid to a farmer would be calculated by multiplying the counter-cyclical payment rate
times the payment yield times the payment acres.
Counter-cyclical payments would vary depending on the effective price.  A maximum counter-cyclical
payment of $94/ton ($480/ton – ($350/ton + $36/ton) would be paid on historic production if market
prices fell to the loan rate or lower.  The farmer would be guaranteed the loan rate of $350/ton on all
current peanut production.  With the higher guarantee of $480/ton for payment yields on 85 percent of
historic production, the minimum average return on the level of production equal to historic yield multiplied
by historic peanut acres would be $460.50/ton (0. 85*$480/ton + 0.15*$350/ton).  If the farmer owned all
quota produced historically, the minimum return guaranteed for the next five years would be $660. 50/ton
on historic production.  This minimum return exceeds the current loan rate of $610/ton, but the farmer
does not have to grow peanuts to receive the direct income support payments.
As the market price plus fixed payment rate rises above the loan rate, the counter-cyclical payment
would be reduced below $94/ton.  If the national average market price becomes $444/ton or higher
($480/ton - $36/ton),  no counter-cyclical payment would be made.  Incomes of historic peanut producers
who continue to grow peanuts would usually be higher when prices go up than when market prices are
lower, even though counter-cyclical payments are reduced.  Incomes would be higher because the
producers would be selling all their peanuts at the higher market prices, but the counter-cyclical payment
would only be applicable to 85 percent of their historic output.  Farmers would receive the fixed decoupled
payment of $36/ton on 85 percent of historic production, regardless of market prices.
SHIFTING  PEANUT  PRODUCTION  AMONG  REGIONS
The three major peanut growing and marketing regions are the Southeast, the Southwest, and Virginia-
North Carolina.  Two types of peanuts, Runners and Virginia, account for most of national production.
On average, the Southeast produced 55 percent of the total national production during 1993-1999, with
over 95 percent of its production in Runners.  On average, the Southwest produced 31 percent of national
production during 1993-1999, with 83 percent of its output in Runners and 16 percent in Virginia peanuts.
The Virginia-North Carolina region produced 14 percent of the national peanut output during 1993-1999
and specialized almost exclusively in the Virginia peanut.  Overall, Runners account for 75 percent of
total domestic production and the Virginia peanut for 14 percent.  The remaining production is Spanish
and Valencia peanuts.
While total national production has remained steady in the years following the FAIR Act, significant shifts
in production shares have occurred among regions.  The Southeast and Virginia-North Carolina experienced7
a 5 percent drop in average production for the years 1996-2000 compared to the 1993-1995 pre-FAIR
average, while the Southwest boosted its production by about 31 percent during the same period.  Recent
peanut production in Virginia is shown in Table 3.  Planted acreage in Virginia during the post-FAIR Act
years averaged 17 percent less than during 1993-1995.  Virginia production shows substantial variability
over the years 1993-2000.  The effective quota available to all Virginia producers has fallen to an average
of 95,838 tons during 1996-2000 from an average of 118,115 tons during 1993-1995.  Average production
during 1996-2000 was 106,016 tons, about 94 percent of the average of 112,429 tons during 1993-1995.
Only a small proportion of Virginia peanuts are sold as additionals; Virginia produces few peanuts specifically
for the additionals market.  In Virginia, as in most other peanut producing states, quota transfers across
county lines have been small.  About 7 percent of Virginia production has shifted among counties (Chvosta,
Rucker and Thurman, 2001).
Most peanut production is contracted for commercial sale rather than placed under CCC loans.  Contract
sales of Runners and Virginia peanuts from the three main producing regions from 1993-1999 are shown
in Table 4.  During the pre-FAIR period 1993-1995, the Southeast commercially contracted 82.3  percent
of all Runners for the domestic market; but during the post-FAIR years of 1996-1999, the share of
Runners contracted from the Southeast fell to 69.0 percent.  The share of the contracted domestic
Runners market from the Southwest went from 17.3 percent during 1993-1995 to 30.1 percent for the
1996-1999 period.  This shift of contract shares reflects a small decline in contracted Runners from the
Southeast (about 7 percent) and a substantial increase (nearly doubling) of contract sales from the
Southwest.  Although not shown in Table 4, a somewhat higher percentage of contract sales from the
Southeast are quota peanuts compared to the Southwest, with the percentage sold as additionals rising in
the Southwest as the total quantity marketed has increased.  Thus, even though the Southeast contracts
the largest quantity of Runners, in recent years the Southwest has contracted a larger quantity of additionals.
While the Virginia-North Carolina region sells only a small amount of Runners, that amount has increased
in the post-FAIR years.  These Runners are typically sold as quota peanuts.
The Southwest region has also increased its contracts of Virginia-type peanuts from a pre-FAIR average
of 43,017 tons per year to a post-FAIR average of 66,275 tons per year (Table 4).  Over 80 percent of the
Southwest contracts are for additionals.  The Virginia-North Carolina region remains the major producer
of the Virginia peanut.  Virginia-North Carolina contracted an average of 251,677 tons of Virginia-type
peanuts during 1996-1999, essentially unchanged from the average of 250,143 tons during 1993-1995.
Over 85 percent of contracted sales in Virginia-North Carolina are for quota peanuts.  Virginia-North
Carolina accounts for about 75 percent of all national contracts of Virginia peanuts, but the Southwest
now contracts a larger quantity of Virginia peanuts as additionals  than Virginia-North Carolina.  Contracts
of Virginia peanuts from the Southeast are of limited and declining quantity and are divided between
quota and additional peanuts.
Table 3.  Virginia Peanut Acreage and Production 
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
 -------------------------------------1,000 acres-------------------------------------- 
Planted  95 92 90 77 76 76 77 76 
Harvested    94 92 89 76 75 75 76 75 
 ---------------------------------------1,000 tons--------------------------------------- 
Production  88.12 145.59 103.46 109.63  95.62 110.62 109.06 105.14 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Basic Economics of a Payments-Based Peanut Support Program
Under the quota system, production of peanuts for the domestic edible market is restricted to designated
states, and peanuts are sold at either the relatively high quota support price in the domestic edible market
or at the lower additionals price.  The new peanut policy proposed in H.R. 2646 eliminates the restriction
that production remain in designated states.  It also separates the income achieved by historic peanut
producers and former quota owners into two separate sources.  The first source of income under the
proposed new policy is revenue received from the market (or from LDPs) for continued production and
sale of peanuts.  The second source of income is the fixed decoupled and counter-cyclical payments plus
the quota compensation payments that the government makes directly to past peanut producers and
quota owners.  These government payments do not depend on whether the historic producer or quota
owner continues to produce peanuts.  Under the current policy, some farmers produce quota peanuts and
quota owners derive revenue under the incentive of the high supported price for domestic edible peanuts.
Other farmers receive only the additionals price.  Under the proposed policy, all farmers would decide
whether to produce peanuts based on the same expected market prices (adjusted for regional and quality
effects).  As a consequence of this new policy, where peanuts are grown may change and so too may the
level of total U.S. or Virginia peanut production.
To illustrate the basic economics of production location under a quota versus a direct-payment support
system, suppose there are two types of regions:  a high production cost region A and a low production
cost region B, as shown in Figure 1.  The supply functions for peanuts from the two regions are given by
SA and SB.  Consider first a quota system with half the quota assigned to each region.  The price is Pq for
the limited quantity of quota peanuts from a region and Pa for any additional peanuts grown in the region.
 








































Figure 1.  Production Regions A and B.10
Under a quota system, the peanut production in region A is Aq and is exclusively for the quota market.
The price for additionals is below the cost of production in A and none are produced.  At quota price Pq,
the rental rate paid for leased quota is RA, which is the difference between the quota price and the
marginal cost of production at Aq.  The total value of rents paid for leased quota (or the equivalent
amount of income retained by quota owners who also produce peanuts) is given by Aq times RA.
In region B, peanuts are grown for both the quota and additionals markets under the quota system.  The
quantity Bq receives the quota price.  The additionals price Pa is above the marginal cost of production at
Bq, and the quantity Ba is produced for the additionals market and receives the additionals price.  Total
peanut output in region B is Bq+a.  The rental rate paid for leased quota is RB, which is the difference
between the quota price and the additionals price, and is a higher quota rental rate than in region A
because of the lower production costs in region B.  The total value of rents paid for leased quota (or
retained by quota owners who are also producers) is given by Bq times RB.
Next consider a switch to a market without quotas and government support provided by direct payments.
The direct payments do not show up explicitly in Figure 1 and should not affect whether a profit-maximizing
farmer in either region decides to produce peanuts, which is a decision that depends only on the market
price and production costs.  If the price were to remain at the level Pa when quotas are eliminated, region
A would not produce any peanuts and region B would continue to produce Bq+a (for simplicity Pa is
assumed to be above the loan rate).  The land once used to produce peanuts in region A would shift into
some other crop or be put into conservation, but farmers and quota owners would still collect the direct
payments to which they were entitled based on their past peanut production and quotas.
A more likely outcome with the policy change from quotas to direct payments is that the equilibrium price
when the quotas are removed will be higher than the old additionals price Pa but not as high as the old
quota price Pq.  This outcome is illustrated by price Pw on Figure 1.  At the new price Pw, production shifts
from region A to region B.  In region A, production falls from Aq to Aw, and in region B production rises
from Bq+a to Bw.  Neither region has quota rents, but historic producers and former quota holders still
receive direct payments based on past production and quota.  Producer income from the market falls in
region A and rises in region B compared to producer income under the quota system.  Producer income
in this comparison is net of the former rents paid for leased quota or the equivalent amount retained by
quota owners who also produce peanuts.  Although peanut production and market income are lower in
region A without quotas, total income of producers and quota owners could be higher or lower when the
direct payments are added to the market income earned by producing output Aw to maximize profits.
ECONOMIC  IMPACTS  OF  H. R. 2646  VERSUS  THE  FAIR
ACT  ON  VIRGINIA  PEANUT  FARMERS
There were 702 Virginia farmers harvesting slightly less than 75,000 acres of peanuts in 1997, down from
935 farms and nearly 94,000 acres five years earlier.  Nearly all peanut production occurs in southeastern
Virginia, with Southampton (33 percent ), Isle of Wight (17 percent), Suffolk (14 percent), and Sussex (13
percent) being the leading producers during 1996-2000.
Under the current peanut support program, profits from Virginia peanut production are critically affected
by the need of most peanut farmers to rent quota.  Because peanut quota and land have been inherited or
sold, a large proportion of Virginia quota is owned by non-farming landowners.  According to the USDA
Farm Service Agency (FSA), non-farming landowners own 151.4 million pounds of quota (79 percent of
total Virginia quota), and peanut producers own 40.1 million pounds (21 percent).  Quota is cash or share11
rented from non-farming landowners on an annual basis along with the land, typically at a price equivalent
to $0. 06/pound of quota.  The peanut producer may be obliged to rent an entire farm from a quota owner,
even though the peanut quota could be produced on only a small portion of the acreage.  In any case, the
common practice is to rent the quota and associated land but raise all peanuts on owned farmland.
Rented farmland is often then used for other crops such as corn, small grains, soybeans, or cotton.  Crop
rotation considerations will play a critical role in determining where a particular crop will be grown in any
given year.
Peanut production has been less profitable since the FAIR Act reduced the quota peanut loan rate and
eliminated annual cost-of-production adjustments.  Profit opportunities for the peanut enterprise in the
past six years have been available only from lowering unit costs of production (either directly or through
increasing yields) or by renting/buying more peanut quota.  Diminished profit opportunities have likely
been a cause (as well as retirements and other factors) of the decrease in the number of peanut farmers
and the increase in average acreage farmed per producer.
Characteristics of a Representative Southampton Peanut Farm
For purposes of estimating the before-and-after economic impacts of H.R. 2646, we have developed a
representative peanut farm in Southampton County.  Accurate data on farm characteristics are not
available.  The total crop acres, acres by crop, and quota have been developed from secondary sources
and in consultation with local extension specialists to create a representative, large, commercial peanut
operation.  The principal characteristics of the farm are illustrated in Table 5.  The farm has 1,171 total
crop acres, with 267 owned acres dedicated to peanut production.  To produce quota peanuts on this
acreage, the farmer must rent 656,480 pounds of quota in addition to his/her own 138,192 pounds of quota
(on average, 17 percent of total peanut quota is owned by peanut producers in Southampton County).
Cotton is produced on 532 acres of owned and rented land; corn, wheat/double-crop soybeans, and full-
season soybeans are planted on the remainder of the rented cropland.
In addition to these crop acreage and quota characteristics, the representative Southampton farm is
assumed to operate according to the yields, economic, and government program factors identified in
Table 6.  Farm yields and commodity program yields are taken to be equal to 1996-2000 county averages
before and after assumed enactment of H.R. 2646.  Historical prices are annual average Virginia cash
prices for each commodity over 1996-2000.  Future prices for all commodities but peanuts are the
average of estimates for 2002-2010 by the Food and Agriculture Policy Research Institute (FAPRI),
adjusted to a Virginia basis.  Only corn is expected to have a higher average price over the next nine
Table 5.  Representative Southampton County Peanut Farm Characteristics 
 Owned  Rented  Total 
Crop Acres       
Peanuts 267  0  267 
Cotton  49 483 532 
Corn  0 156 156 
Wheat/Double-crop  Soybeans  0 167 167 
Full-season  Soybeans  0 49 49 
Total Acres  316  855  1,171 
Peanut Quota (pounds)  138,192  656,480  794,774 
Sources:  USDA/Farm Service Agency; U.S. Census of Agriculture 1997.  
Mike Roberts, Virginia Cooperative Extension (personal communication). 
Note:  Crops are rotated across both owned and rented land, and actual planting location will vary by year. 
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years than its historic price.  And given current cotton prices, which have dipped below $0.30/lb, it
appears that the estimated future price of cotton is unlikely to be achieved.  Costs of production are taken
from Virginia Cooperative Extension budgets for 2001 and held constant for the analysis.  Variable costs
of production include all costs that vary with the scale of a crop’s production.  Fixed costs include
enterprise overhead costs such as machinery capital recovery, insurance, and taxes, all of which must be
recovered regardless of the scale at which a crop is produced.  For purposes of this analysis, we assume
that the rental rate for peanut quota land is $180/acre and that all other cropland (including peanut land
when there are no quotas) rents for $50/acre.  Rent is not included with variable or fixed costs (unless
indicated) but is deducted separately as a farm overhead cost before calculating net income.
Future peanut prices are not estimated by FAPRI.  If the peanut quota program is eliminated, we can
assume that the U.S. price will gravitate towards the world market price, and $400/ton is used initially for
this analysis.  The farmer receives significant income from FAIR Act program payments on historic
production of corn, cotton, and wheat program crop base acreage and yield.  We also include supplemental
AMTA payments appropriated by Congress during 1998-2000 but not disaster payments appropriated
during 1996-2000.  FAIR Act commodity program base acreages for corn, cotton, and wheat on peanut
farms are estimated from county-level USDA/FSA data for all types of farms.  We have likely
underestimated current program base acreage on peanut farms.  However, since program yields under
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General Assumptions 
Yield 
a  105 bu.  779 lbs.  57 bu./28 bu.  35 bu.  2,984 lbs. 
(1.492 tons) 






































Historical Values (1996-2000 under the FAIR Act) 
Rent $50  $50  $50  $50  $180 
Historical Price


























Future Values (2002-2011 assuming H.R. 2646) 
Rent $50  $50  $50  $50  $50 
Expected Price



























a USDA/NASS Southampton County 1996-2000. 
b Virginia Cooperative Extension Southeast District Farm Management Budgets 2001.  
c USDA/NASS Virginia Annual Average Prices Received by Farmers 1996-2000. 
d USDA/FSA. Program yields are assumed equal to county yields. 
e FAPRI Forecasts 2002-2010, except peanuts. 
g Market prices of peanuts without a quota program are unknown, but $400 per ton is a reasonable starting 
point. 
g We assumed that double-cropped soybean acres will not be included as soybean base acres under H.R. 2646. 
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FAIR are fixed at 1981-1985 levels, we have likely overestimated program yields by using current yield
levels.  The net result (with the offsetting effects of these two estimates) is expected to be representative
of peanut farms in Southampton County.  Under H.R. 2646, fixed and counter-cyclical payments are
provided for corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton, as well as peanuts, and we include any such payments in
our analysis.
Market Income and Government Payments under FAIR
To provide a baseline for examining the economic impacts of H.R. 2646 on the representative Southampton
peanut farm, the data from tables 5 and 6 are used to estimate enterprise production costs, market
income, and government payments.  Estimates of the average net farm-related income of the representative
farm under the FAIR Act during 1996-2000 are shown in Table 7.  “Net Return from Crop Marketings”
are shown as returns from market sales of the commodities net of variable and variable plus fixed (total
direct) enterprise costs.  Since the quota peanut price is the effective market price, peanut sales provide
$243,000 (41 percent) of the total sales of $591,300 (not shown in Table 7).  Cotton sales represent a
slightly higher proportion (42 percent) of farm sales, but peanuts generate higher net returns over variable
or total direct costs.  No crop other than peanuts and cotton covers the total direct cropping costs of
production.
The farm earns $188,739 net of production variable costs (Table 7) but pays $71,350 in peanut quota and
land rent.  Even though the farm receives no direct government payments for peanuts, commodity
program payments for corn, wheat, and cotton total $33,676, bringing the net income from farm operations
to $151,065.  This total might appear to be a considerable sum, but such net income must pay for all crop
machinery and farm overhead costs, non-machinery debt servicing and reinvestment, management of
the operator, returns to the operator’s investment in the farming business, and family living expenses.  As
Table 7.  Costs and Returns under the FAIR Act (1996-2000), Southampton Peanut Farm 
 
Crop 
Net Cropping Enterprise 
Returns over Variable Costs 
a 
Net Cropping Enterprise Returns 
over Variable + Fixed Costs 
 ---------------------------$--------------------- 
Peanuts 87,405  39,177 
Cotton 77,726  10,555 
Corn 7,739  (4,551) 
Wheat/double-crop Soybeans  12,313  (10,988) 
Full-season Soybeans  3,556  (770) 






Government Payments  33,676 
Rent 71,350 
Net Farm-related Income over 
Variable Costs + Rent 
 
151,065 
Net Farm-related Income over 
Variable Costs + Fixed 




a Variable costs per enterprise do not include rent. 
Notes:  Historical prices, yields, base and planted acres from Table 6. 
Figures in parentheses are negative. 
“Net farm-related income” over variable costs, fixed costs, and rents is returns to overhead costs of 
the farm business not directly related to cropping enterprises, and to owner’s management and equity. 
Debt servicing and family expenses are not included in costs. 
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it is, the business is not quite able to cover total cropping fixed costs, and in reality, a representative
peanut farm with these characteristics and operating under these conditions is not likely to be economically
viable over the longer term.  In short, the farm business is not covering its total direct cropping expenses,
but it is kept afloat (given the assumed land and quota rental rates) only by government payments equal
to 22 percent of farm-related income net of variable costs and rent.
Market Income and Government Payments under H.R. 2646
Table 8 displays estimates of farm income assuming H.R. 2646 becomes law and using future prices
shown in Table 6.  Peanut prices would undoubtedly fall from quota support levels, and the current
analysis assumes that Virginia peanut prices will average $400/ton.  If the representative farm were to
plant the same acreage as under the FAIR Act, the peanut enterprise would barely cover its variable
costs of production.  Cotton would provide 69 percent of total crop sales revenue, which would fall by
$80,700 (14 percent) from the 1996-2000 FAIR Act level.  No crop would generate enough revenue from
sales to pay the total cost of its production.  Government payments would more than double for the first
five years of the farm program, primarily because of peanut quota buy-out and other peanut-related
payments.  During the quota buy-out years, net farm-related income over variable costs and rent is only
slightly lower (-3.6 percent) than under the FAIR Act.  After five years, if quota buy-out payments end
as proposed in H.R. 2646, total government payments fall by $13,819 (17 percent), and net farm-related
income would be lower than experienced under the FAIR Act.
Effects of Peanut Prices and Quota Ownership
Prediction of post-quota program prices is especially difficult since there has not been a competitive U.S.
peanut market since before World War II.  The analysis in the previous section uses $400/ton as the
Table 8.  Costs and Returns under H.R. 2646, Southampton Peanut Farm 
 
Crop 
Net Cropping Enterprise 
Returns over Variable Costs 
a 
Net Cropping Enterprise Returns 
over Variable + Fixed Costs 
 -----------------------------$------------------------- 
Peanuts 3,749  (44,480) 
Cotton 74,489  (7,391) 
Corn 13,472  (1,182) 
Wheat/Double-crop Soybeans  13,775  (9,526) 
Full-season Soybeans  2,562  (1,765) 









Net Farm-related Income over 
Variable Costs + Rent 
 
145,554 
Net Farm-related Income over 
Variable Costs + Fixed 
Costs + Rent 
 
(9,762) 
a Unless stated, net returns over variable costs per enterprise do not include rent. 
b Includes quota buy-out of $13,819 that ends in 2006 under H.R. 2646.  
Notes:  Projected prices, yields, base, and planted acres from Table 6.  
Figures in parentheses are negative. “Net farm-related income” over variable costs, fixed costs, and 
rent  is returns to overhead costs of the farm business not directly related to cropping enterprises and to 
owner’s management and equity. 
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market price for peanuts assuming H.R. 2646 becomes law.  Table 9 shows net farm-related income
over variable costs, total direct costs, and rent with alternative peanut prices of  $300, $400, and $500 per
ton, holding expected prices for all other crops equal to the baseline shown in Table 8.  If peanut prices
are $300/ton, loan deficiency and counter-cyclical deficiency payments provide a safety net for the
peanut farmer such that net farm-related income over variable costs and rent falls by only 2 percent from
the baseline.  Conversely, net farm-related income over variable costs and rent does not equal the level
of 1996-2000 under the FAIR Act unless future peanut prices reach $450/ton.  If prices rise to $500/ton,
increased market returns cause net farm-related income over variable costs and rent to reach $170,491,
exceeding the level under the FAIR Act by 13 percent.  The representative Southampton peanut farm
covers its total cropping costs of production when peanut prices are $460/ton and other crop prices are as
given in Table 6.  Again, if quota buy-out payments of $13,819 end after five years, net income would fall
correspondingly.
The effects of varying degrees of quota ownership are presented in Table 10.  The characteristics of the
farm examined in each scenario are identical to those described above, except for the amount of quota
owned.  Net farm-related income (including government payments) is shown for 1996-2000 under the
FAIR Act and assuming H.R. 2646.  If the peanut producer owns all quota produced, farm-related
income over variable costs and rent increases substantially (18 percent) with H.R. 2646 during 2002-
2006 over that of the FAIR Act, since $79,477 in quota buy-out payments are received.  After 2006,
when quota buy-out payments end, farm-related income over variable costs and rent falls to $131,735, or
27 percent below the corresponding FAIR Act level.  A producer currently renting all his/her quota would
not be benefited by the buy-out payments during 2002-2006, and net farm-related income would be 9
percent lower than the average FAIR Act level.  Net farm-related income over total costs follows the
same pattern.  Only if a substantial amount of quota is owned will such a farm cover total cropping costs
with other crop prices as given in Table 6 and peanuts at $400/ton.
Profit-maximizing Cropping under H. R. 2646
H.R. 2646 offers planting flexibility to peanut farmers who previously would lose revenue derived from
high prices for quota peanuts if they shifted to other crops.  Government payments do not vary with
current acres planted to a program crop; hence, the peanut producer is free to plant nearly any crop on
Table 9.  Net farm-related Income under H.R. 2646 for Various Peanut Prices 
300 400 500   
Net Farm-related Income 
a over  -------------------------$ per ton------------------------ 
Variable Costs, Including Rent  142,566  145,554  170,491 
Total Costs  (12,750)  (9,762)  15,175 
a Includes quota buy-out of $13,819 that ends in 2006 in H.R. 2646. 
 
Table 10.  Net Farm-related Income for Alternative Quota Ownership 







(from Table 7) 
HR2646
b 






 over --------------------------------------------------$------------------------------------------------- 
Variable Costs, Including Rent  179,665  211,212  151,065  145,554  144,955  131,735 
Total Costs  (24,349)  55,896  (4,251)  (9,762)  (10,361)  (23,582) 
a Includes quota buy-out of $79,477 that ends in 2006 in H.R. 2646.  
b Includes quota buy-out of $13,819 that ends in 2006 in H.R. 2646. 
 16
his/her owned and rented acreage.  This flexibility is of value to the representative peanut producer.
Results of a net income maximization model are displayed in Table 11.  The results are based on the
expected prices from Table 6 (including $400 peanuts), the (albeit unrealistic) assumption that rotational
considerations do not affect planting choices, and the assumptions that the land base (owned plus rented)
remains at 1,171 acres and cotton equipment and time available are only sufficient to plant up to 700
acres.  The results indicate that peanuts would not be a profitable choice on either owned or rented
acres.  Returns from cotton are such that 700 acres of owned and rented cotton land are planted, and 471
rented acres are planted to corn.  Government payments are not affected by crops chosen in the current
year, and the net farm-related income over variable costs and rent is approximately $30,000 higher for
this profit-maximizing cropping pattern (with no peanuts planted) compared to the scenario in Table 8.
The farm now covers the full crop production costs, earning a net return of $50,708.  Stated another way,
the peanut farmer who did not adjust his planting acreage to reflect new prices and planting flexibility
would “pay” $30,000 for the decision to plant peanuts.  This profit maximizing opportunity rests on the
assumption that projected cotton prices occur as shown in Table 6 and that the farm also shifts its
acreage out of wheat/double cropped soybeans (167 acres) and full-season soybeans (49 acres).
For peanuts on owned acreage to enter the set of profitable crop choices, peanut prices would have to
rise to $448/ton.  If prices are expected to fall below this level, the representative peanut farmer would
choose not to plant peanuts.  If H.R. 2646 is enacted, Virginia peanut farmers would need to carefully
assess their costs, price expectations, and profit opportunities under the dramatically changed economic
environment.



















Owned Acres  0  316  0  0  0  316 
Rented Acres  0  384  471  0  0  855 
            
 ------------------------------------$------------------------------------------ 
Net Cropping Enterprise 




















Government Payments  80,257 
Rent 42,750 
Net Farm-related Income 




Net Farm-related Income 
over Variable Costs + 
Fixed Costs + Rent 
 
20,879 
Note:  Assumes farm has base equal to historical plantings, peanut sales price of $400, does not change 
baseline total owned or rented acreage, does not consider rotational requirements, and no more than 
700 cotton acres can be planted due to field time or machinery constraints. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Peanuts are one of the most important cash crops in Virginia.  The quota system has regulated production
of peanuts for the domestic edible market since the 1930s.  Quota peanut production exceeded domestic
edible demand in the mid-1990s.  To bring the market more closely into balance, the FAIR Act lowered
peanut loan rate and made changes in how the effective national quota is determined.  As a result of
these legislated changes and increasing peanut imports under new trade agreements, effective peanut
quota has fallen both nationally and for Virginia producers since 1996.  Peanut acreage and production
have declined in Virginia and in the Virginia-North Carolina and Southeast regions but have increased in
the Southwest.  Nationally, a higher proportion of total peanut production has been for the additionals
market.
A new approach to peanut policy has been included in the Farm Security Act of 2001 (H.R. 2646).  The
peanut provisions of H.R. 2646, if enacted, would replace the traditional quota system of regulated
production for the domestic edible market with a non-quota system of direct support payments similar to
those for grains and cotton.  A loan rate would still provide a minimum price guarantee for peanuts, but
the guarantee would be lower than has been provided in the past.  Past producers of both quota and
additional peanuts qualifying as historic peanut producers based on production during 1998-2001 would
be eligible for fixed and counter-cyclical direct support payments from the government.
If a direct-payment support program for peanuts replaces the traditional system of quota regulation of
production, Virginia peanut farmers will face market situations and farm production decisions that are
quite different from the past.  Historic peanut producers and quota owners in Virginia would receive
substantial direct payments from the government in compensation for the lower prices that are likely in
the edible peanut market once the quota system is eliminated.
If a farmer owns the quota for peanuts grown, for the next five years H.R. 2646 guarantees a minimum
return from market prices, LDPs, fixed direct payments, and counter-cyclical direct payments of $660.50/
ton for their historic average output during 1998-2001.  This guaranteed average return per ton is higher
than the loan rate of $610/ton under the FAIR Act.  However, Virginia farmers own only 21 percent of
the quota for peanuts they grow.  Farmers who have been renting quota will not receive the quota buy-
out payments included in H.R. 2646, since these payments go directly to the quota owner, and the farmer
is guaranteed only $460.50/ton for historic production with rented quota.  A farmer renting peanut quota
should see land rental costs go down because quota rental is no longer required to sell peanuts in the
domestic edible market.  But Virginia farmers may not see land rental costs go down by the full difference
between peanut quota land rent and rent for non-peanut land of comparable productivity because quota
rental costs in Virginia have generally been below the proposed buy-out level.  Our diagrammatic analysis
(Figure 1) illustrates that quota rental costs are lower in higher-cost production areas and that some
production could move from relatively high-cost production areas to lower-cost production areas when
quota limitations on the location of peanut production are eliminated.  Such a shift of production out of the
region could be the situation facing Virginia peanut growers if H.R. 2646 comes into effect.  With the
direct payments, it does not necessarily mean Virginia producers would be worse off, but it could change
traditional cropping patterns and production.
These points are illustrated by considering the effects of H.R. 2646 for a representative commercial
farm that has been planting peanuts in Southampton County.  We have shown that under current farm
policies and recent prices and yields, this representative farm produces peanuts, cotton, corn, soybeans,
and wheat.  Taking crop revenue and government payments into account, farm-related income exceeds18
cropping enterprise variable costs and land and quota rents but does not quite cover the farmer’s enterprise-
related fixed costs.  Under the assumptions that H.R. 2646 becomes the new farm policy, peanut prices
are $400/ton, and other prices are at levels forecast on average for the next nine years, market sales
revenue declines if the farmer continues with his/her current cropping decisions (primarily because
peanut prices are lower), but direct payments from the government increase.  Total farm-related income
over variable costs and rent falls slightly, and the farm has a somewhat larger deficit when fixed costs are
included in the analysis.  This farm does better if we assume it owns all of the quota for its peanut
production or if market prices for peanuts are higher than $400/ton in the future.
More importantly, if this representative farmer takes advantage of the planting flexibility allowed on
peanut acreage under H.R. 2646, he/she can raise farm-related income over variable costs and rent by
nearly $30,000 and earn a farm-related income over fixed costs of nearly $50,000 by shifting to cotton
and corn production instead of peanuts, soybeans, or wheat.  This specific result rests on projected cotton
prices during 2002-2011 that are somewhat higher than current levels and ignores crop rotation considerations
that make continuous cotton/corn undesirable.  But this example of cropping decisions illustrates the
opportunities that H.R. 2646 may provide by introducing a direct payment support program for peanuts.
Virginia farmers will have to be conscious of the new calculus of maximizing farm income under such a
new law.  They will have to be responsive to very different options if the traditional quota system is
altered as proposed.19
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